The model doesn't invent prejudice. Skewed training data becomes skewed predictions.
Decisions that should be merit-based become proxies for race, gender, or wealth. This is automated and it happens at a scale no human bias ever could.
Disaggregate your metrics. A model can be accurate and still unfair. Audit your model by subgroup.
Model gives a score or answer, but no reason. "Why?" becomes a guess, not an explanation.
No debugging, no appeal, no meaningful audit. If nobody can inspect the decision, nobody can defend it.
Use interpretable models when possible. Use XAI tools to extract insights from your model. If you can't explain it, you can't trust it.
Models don't just learn patterns, they memorize. Rare sequences, personal records, credentials get encoded directly into model weights.
The model becomes an unintended data store. Query it the right way and it reproduces content it was never meant to expose.
Scrub sensitive data before training. Apply differential privacy to guarantee protection. Red-team your model.
The model predicts the most plausible next token, not the most truthful one. It has no mechanism to know what it doesn't know.
Fabricated citations, invented policies, and wrong technical answers delivered with full confidence.
Ground outputs on verified sources. Never let model output reach a user without a trust boundary between generation and delivery.
Safety rules are part of the model's behavior, not hard-coded limits. Attackers use roleplay, indirection, or adversarial prompts to bypass them.
The model reveals content it was supposed to refuse: harmful instructions, toxic outputs, hidden prompts, or restricted information.
Use layered protections: stronger alignment, adversarial training, output monitoring, and continuous red-teaming.
A malicious instruction hidden inside a PDF gets processed as if it was part of the prompt.
The LLM silently changes behavior across the workflow and outputs content it was not designed to produce.
Treat external content as untrusted input. Isolate them from the user prompts.
Data and instructions share the same context. Any document, email, or web page the agent reads can hijack what it does next.
Agents don't just talk, they execute. A mistake isn't a wrong answer, it's a deleted database, a leaked file, a published post.
By the time a human notices, the action is already done. Speed and autonomy collapse the window for oversight.
Give the agent only the permissions the task truly needs.
Prefer reversible actions and confirm before anything irreversible.
Put a person in front of high-stakes or destructive actions.
Isolate agent execution so the blast radius stays bounded.
Record every tool call with inputs, outputs, and timestamp.
Assume a clever prompt will still try to cross the boundary.